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The current condition of the gas industry is one of the most
crucial factors influencing the Russian stateÕs functioning,
internal situation and international position. Not only is gas
the principal energy resource in Russia, it also subsidises
other sectors of the economy. Status of the main European
gas exporter strengthens also RussiaÕs importance in the in-
ternational arena.
Available information concerning the Russian monopoly gas
company Gazprom shows that, ten years after the fall of
communism, the company is not in good shape. Contrary 
to what is often said, it is not true that Gazprom is risking
a total collapse of production. It is furthermore likely that 
the company, even without major reforms, should be capable
of maintaining its current production levels for several more
years. However, if Gazprom is to become a dynamic enterpri-
se able to face the challenges of the growing Russian and
Western markets, it needs investment and reforms. Therefore
lifting Gazprom out of its current crisis appears to be one 
of the most important tasks for the Russian government. 
The efforts made to that end will decide, to a great degree,
the economic situation in the Russian Federation and its po-
sition in Europe.
C E S  S t u d i e s
Russian gas industry 
Ð current condition 
and prospects
K a t a rzyna Pe ¸ c z y Ä s k a - N a ¸ « c z
I. The gas industry Ð the pillar
of the Russian state
The gas industry is not only a pillar of the Russian economy,
but a pillar upon which the operations of the entire state are
based.
Three factors determine the importance of this sector for the
Russian Federation (RF):
1. The role of the gas sector revenues for the Russian econo-
my
2. The role of Ôblue fuelÕ in the countryÕs energy balance
3. Opportunities based on gas exports to develop internatio-
nal co-operation and strengthen RussiaÕs position in the in-
ternational arena.
RussiaÕs annual gas production amounts to some 500Ð600 bil-
lion cubic meters (see table 1). Between 1997 and 1999, it con-
stituted 24 percent of world production 1. In the year 2000, reve-
nues from the gas sector provided some 25 percent of the state
budget 2, while the value of gas exports amounted to 15 percent
of all Russian exports 3.
Gas is the main energy resource on the domestic market. 
The share of Ôblue fuelÕ in the countryÕs energy balance amounts
to some 50 percent 4. Despite a significant drop in its consump-
tion in the 1990s (mainly due to a drop in industrial production),
360 billion cubic meters of gas were used in 1999. At the same
time, gas prices are significantly lower than on the world markets.
Because of existing regulations, companies cannot raise gas pri-
ces and experience problems trying to force debtors to pay their
debts off. As aresult, the gas monopoly subsidises the rest of the
Russian economy. Without cheap Ð often virtually free Ð supplies
of this resource, and without consequent very low energy prices,
a great majority of Russian enterprises would not be able to ope-
rate.
Apart from playing an important role in the domestic arena, gas
is also an important factor which allows Russia to strengthen its
position in the international arena. Russia supplies 100 percent
of the gas imported by the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus. It
also monopolizes supplies to Poland, Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Finland, and Austria. Twenty percent of the
gas supplies imported by the European Union comes from Ru s s i a5.
Since the early 1990s, gas exports to Western Europe have been
rising systematically. If Russia is able to maintain adequate pro-
duction levels, this trend could continue during the next few
years. On October 6 last year, EU Energy Commissioner Loyola de
Palacio expressed an interest in raising gas imports 
(a doubling of the amount was even mentioned) from Russia to
the 15 countries of the EU. A report prepared by Gazprom says
that contracts so far signed call for a60 percent rise in exports of
gas to Europe by the year 2010 6. The fact that Russia is the main
producer of gas in Europe and probably would be in the future is
alleviated by the negative impacts of the weak Russian economy.
Apart from energy resources, Russia plays only amarginal role in
global and European trade (in 1999, respectively 1 and 2 percent
of trade volume 7).
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Sources: * British Petroleum, www.bp.com/worldenergy
** Evaluated from the difference between production and consumption
*** Report for 1999 by Gazprom, www.gazprom.ru/report99 (data for 1995Ð1999 period); www.energy.ru (data for 1990Ð1994 period)
**** Evaluated from the difference between the overall export and the export to non former USSR countries
Production*
Consumption*
Export**
Export to non former USSR countries***
Export to the CIS and Baltic States****
1992
597.4
417.3
180.1
79.7
100.4
1993
576.5
416.0
160.5
85.1
75.4
1994
566.4
390.9
175.5
100.5
75.0
1995
555.4
377.8
177.6
117.4
60.2
1996
561.1
379.9
181.2
123.5
57.7
1997
532.6
350.4
182.2
116.8
65.4
1998
551.1
364.7
186.4
120.5
65.9
1999
551.9
363.6
188.3
126.8
61.5
Table 1. Production, consumption and export of gas from Russia 1992Ð1999 (in billion cubic meters)
II. Gazprom Ð the monopolistÕs
c r i s i s
The importance of Gazprom on the
Russian gas market
The production, transport, and export of Russian gas is virtually
monopolized by Gazprom. The holding owns 60.1 percent of
Russian natural gas resources8, together with almost all gas pipe-
lines (including all pipelines needed for exports). In 1999, it pro-
duced 94 percent of RussiaÕs gas 9. Its share in exports was about
85 percent 10. In reality, GazpromÕs position on the Russian mar-
ket is even stronger than those figures indicate, as most Ôinde-
pendentÕ exports are controlled by the ITERA company, which has
very close links with Gazprom. The position of Gazprom on the
Russian gas market is therefore so strong that the condition
of the company determines the state of the entire sector.
The condition of Gazprom
It is virtually impossible to ascertain GazpromÕs true financial sit-
uation or profitability. This is mainly due to the lack of trans-
parency of the companyÕs finances and transactions. Most likely
only a very few people Ð those who have had connections with
members of the board Ð are aware of the reliable, true account-
ing. The greatest shareholder, i.e. the state itself, has no access
to reliable information (or at least has not had until recently).
Although the available data does not permit adetailed description
of GazpromÕs activities, it is nevertheless helpful in uncovering
some of the main trends. There seem to be many indications
that the economic condition of the company is not very good.
One of them is that GazpromÕs profitability has been rather low in
recent years; in 1998, its net loss was 7.9 billion dollars, in 1999
they made a loss of 2.9 billion dollars, while in the first half of
2000 there was a small profit of 0.7 billion dollars. Another neg-
ative sign is t[O1]Another negative hat gas production has been
less than dynamic in recent years; since 1992, the volume of gas
produced by the company has fallen by some 8 percent (in 1992
Gazprom produced 570 billion cubic meters, while in 1999 the
figure was 523 billion) 11. Experts point that this is due to a dras-
tic drop in spending on the conservation of gas resources.
Exploitation of deposits in Western Siberia Ð where the largest
and most important deposits are currently located Ð is becoming
increasingly more costly and difficult. Meanwhile new deposits
have not been prepared for exploitation. This lack of investment
has also resulted in a very poor condition of the infrastructure.
(According to evaluations, in the early 1990s less than 10 percent
of the infrastructure would be termed as adequate in the West,
while 15 percent needed to be replaced immediately) 12. Another
indicator of the companyÕs difficult condition is the size of its
debts, which in 1999 exceeded 11 billion dollars.
A significant chunk of companyÕs revenues is being used to ser-
vice those debts, which in turn affects financial liquidity, and also
makes realization of any new projects very difficult.
Also, data published in a report by the Russian Audit Chamber in
January 2001 show that GazpromÕs condition is deteriorating. The
financial results presented in this document demonstrate that the
companyÕs ability to meet its financial commitments was limited
in the previous year.
On the basis of the above it is difficult to present a detailed
description of GazpromÕs condition. One cannot rule out the
possibility that the company is able to operate without major
changes or restructuring for a few more years. However, it
seems reasonable to state that in order to boost production
and most likely even to maintain production on the current
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Source: authorÕs evaluation 
based on the exchange rates, 
figures in rubles and indexes given in GazpromÕs report
for 1999 and first half of 2000
Incomes (losses)
Long-term debts
Short-term debts
31.12.1998
-7.1
8.95
1.26
31.12.1999
-2.9
8.64
3.15
30.06.2000
0.7
8.13
3.96
Table 2. GazpromÕs incomes and debts (in millions dollars)
level, multi-billion investments are necessary (experts esti-
mate that 50Ð60 billion dollars might be needed)13. Such sums
can be acquired only from the West. Gazprom, which has gas
resources and a transport infrastructure at its disposal, is poten-
tially a very attractive partner for other big companies from this
sector. The Russian enterprise has already established close links
with strong companies in Western Europe 14 that are interested in
maintaining or even developing co-operation. However, foreign
investors face a number of difficult problems in the gas sector,
including (1) GazpromÕs ownership, (2) the lack of transparency
in the companyÕs management, and (3) the lack of free-market
mechanisms in RussiaÕs energy sector.
1. Ownership
According to data from the Russian Audit Chamber, 38.37 percent
of shares in Gazprom belongs to the state, while 32.62 percent is
owned by Russian legal entities, 18.7 percent by Russian private
owners, and 10.31 percent by foreign investors (as of May 2000).
The Russian legal entities which are GazpromÕs shareholders
include commercial banks, investment funds, pension funds,
insurance companies and enterprises. It is very difficult to estab-
lish what their ownership structure may be; it is known that
Gazprom, for its part, has shares in many of them. One can also
suspect that some of the entities are owned by the managers of
the monopoly. Stroytransgaz is one example here, a company
which has been receiving lucrative contracts for the construction
of GazpromÕs infrastructure, and which is controlled by the chil-
dren of Gazprom board members. It was revealed a few months
ago that the company owns 4 percent of GazpromÕs shares. As for
shares belonging to private investors, however, their proportion is
being diminished every year (30 percent in 1997, only 20 percent
in 1998) 15, although information about such transactions is not
available to the public. Commentators assume that the shares
might have been acquired by GazpromÕs various entities
(Gazfond, Rosgazifikatsya, etc.), or simply by individual people
linked to GazpromÕs management. Nor can it be ruled out that
some shares belonging to western investors are actually con-
trolled by companies linked to Gazprom. All this information
invites suspicions that the Russian gas giant is, to a greater and
greater extent, being owned by itself and the people linked with
its current management.
2. Company management
Executive power in the company is being exercised by the Board
of Directors, which is led by the president (for the past eight years
Rem Vyakhiryev has held the post). The Council of Directors
(including, among others, the shareholders of the company) has
legislative and audit power. However, since the founding of the
company in 1992, the shareholders (even the state, which holds
the major stake) have had only limited possibilities to exercise
any control over the managment. Given the legal chaos and wide-
spread corruption in Russia, the situation has encouraged dis-
honesty. Supposedly, for the last few years, as aresult of more or
less legal activities, GazpromÕs assets have been transferred to
other companies with links to current or former board members.
The activities of the ITERA company, which was founded in 1992,
are perhaps the most visible example. ITERA is one of the biggest
trading agents of Gazprom in the CIS countries. The monopolist
Gazprom often forces its contractors to use ITERA as a dealer in
most of its transaction in the CIS countries. ITERA has also for
some time been active on the Russian market as a producer and
seller of gas. A company which started from the scratch eight
years ago, has become the leading exporter of gas to former
Soviet republics. According to data made available by ITERA, in
1999 the company sold 60 billion cubic meters of gas to the CIS
and Baltic countries, compared to 47 billion cubic meters sold to
those countries by Gazprom. In 1999, ITERA also started exploit-
ing gas. The company planned to produce 20 billion of cubic
meters in the year 2000 16.
3. Lack of free market mechanisms 
in the gas sector
In 1999, 70 percent 17 of gas produced by Gazprom was sold on
the domestic market. However, the prices of Ôblue fuelÕ within
Russia are several times lower than in Central or Western Europe.
Besides, agreat number of recipients either fail to pay or are late
with the payments. Gazprom is trying to change that by either
demanding that the prices paid by domestic users be raised, 
or that production targeted at the domestic market be reduced
(i.e. by encouraging power plants to use alternative resources like
coal or mazout, and also stressing the need to use energy in more
efficient ways). However, those attempts have met with strong
resistance on the part of gas recipients, especially the main con-
sumer in Russia (which is also the greatest debtor of Gazprom) Ð
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the producer and distributor of electric power RAO YES ROSSII
(Unified Energy System of Russia) which has the monopoly 
on the Russian market. RAO YES, on its side, the energy sector
has an excuse for its debts towards Gazprom: lack of payments
from its own customers (mainly the army and other government-
funded institutions). They also warn that limiting gas supplies 
or raising prices considerably over a short period of time could
lead to a serious energy crisis. Of great importance for potential
investors is another problem of the Russian gas sector Ð the total
infrastructure monopoly of Gazprom (principally the export gas
pipelines). That makes it very difficult, virtually impossible in
fact, for companies independent of Gazprom to send Ôblue fuelÕ
through or from Russia.
III. Reform Prospects
Reform Program
A debate concerning the possible reform of Gazprom and 
the whole gas sector has been going on in Russia for long time.
The only official document which contains any proposals for
reforms in the gas sector is a report commissioned by President
Vladimir Putin and prepared by German Gref (currently minister
for trade and economic development), entitled Development of
Russia Ð Strategy to 2010. Those proposals, however, are very
vague or only address short-term solutions. The document calls,
among others, for giving independent producers access to gas
pipelines and for forcing consumers to make payments. It is also
suggested that transport and production costs should be differ-
entiated in the final price. The Strategy calls for development of
the sector and gradual price rises until the year 2005. However,
no specific solutions are presented. At the same time however,
it has been known for some time, that particular ministries (e.g.
Ministry for Trade and Economic Development, headed by Gref)
are preparing a reform program.
The program was presented during a government meeting on
December 7, 2000. It calls for three stages of reform:
1. During the first stage, an independent gas producer would gain
access to gas pipelines. GazpromÕs subsidiaries would be turned
into shareholding companies in which Gazprom would have
shares.
2. During the second stage, independent producers who sell gas
on the domestic market and export it to the CIS countries would
increase their share on the market to 25 percent. Gas prices in
Russia would rise to about 50 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters.
Gazprom would, however, retain its monopoly of gas exports to
Europe.
3. During the final stage, independent gas producers would be
able to export gas outside the CIS, and at the same time the gov-
ernment would limit price regulations on the domestic market.
The above proposal proved very controversial, and did not win
official approval. Nor have any specific decisions that could lead
to its implementation been made.
It seems that at the moment the Russian authorities do not have
a complex vision of what reforms are needed in the gas sector.
The lack of a clear restructuring program does not, however,
mean that the Kremlin is not undertaking any initiatives in the gas
sector. During the last year some changes were introduced which,
although they were mostly political, they had a significant impact
on GazpromÕs situation. It should be mentioned here however,
that only some of the above changes were in line with the rec-
ommendations in GrefÕs Strategy.
Changes in the gas sector in 2000
The most important change that took place in the gas sector in
the previous year affected relations between Gazprom and the
state. Since its creation, Gazprom has been astate within astate.
It operated without obeying the rules, and with only minimal reg-
ulation on the part of the federal authorities. As aresult, Gazprom
would not pay normal taxes (according to current tax regulations)
but would actually negotiate the amount to be paid each time.
And even then, most often the company would not fulfil its oblig-
ations anyway. After negotiations it would receive additional dis-
counts Ð either interest-free credits would be granted or the tax
debt would be Ôrestructured.Õ According to estimates of the Audit
Chamber, in 1999 alone the monopoly failed to pay a sum of 815
million dollars into the budget. The privileges won by the compa-
ny would depend on the good relations of the current board mem-
bers with the government. Most often however, the Gazprom
lobby would prove quite successful and influential (most influen-
tial when Viktor Chernomyrdin, VyakhiryevÕs predecessor as
GazpromÕs president, was RussiaÕs prime minister). The only
obligations being paid to the state were domestic gas supplies, at
very low prices. Occasional attempts by state officials to launch
reforms or exercise any control over the gas giant always failed.
The situation started to change after Vladimir Putin took power.
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The new president undertook activities that were to result in
greater control of the state over the company. As a result, the
Kremlin readily encouraged political co-operation by the manage-
ment. The participation of Gazprom in one of PutinÕs most impor-
tant ÔprojectsÕ proves that some kind of deal must have been
made by Gazprom and the Kremlin. One of the most vocal anti-
president forces in the country, NTV Television which belongs to
the Media Most holding (MM) will most likely be silenced. Its for-
mer owner Vladimir Gusinsky, who had received credits from
Gazprom, was forced to sell MMÕs control stake in the holding.
The shares are to be transferred in August 2001.
Thus, at the moment Gazprom and the Kremlin have under-
taken co-operation on the political platform. Another sphere
of co-operation has been foreign policy; more and more
often, the Kremlin together with Russian diplomats promote
the energy interests of the Russian Federation Ð and by
extension GazpromÕs interests Ð on the international arena.
One example is the support that President Putin and the Russian
government offered to Gazprom in Ukraine (thanks to their
efforts, Ukraine agreed to acknowledge part of its debts towards
Russia, and began repayment negotiations) and in the European
Union. There are reasons to think that this co-operation is
also proceeding in the opposite direction; Gazprom is ready,
under Kremlin pressure, to use its influence in the gas sec-
tor (by raising prices or reducing supplies) to realize some
political interests of the Russian state.
Despite co-operation on the international arena, and despite
GazpromÕs engagement in domestic politics undertaken by
the government and the management of the gas monopoly,
a fierce battle is still going on Ð control over the company 
is at stake. The main aim of the government is to slow down
the process of company appropriation by private entities.
One of the first moves made towards that end was the introduc-
tion in August 1999 of an additional fifth member, representing
state interests, to the Board of Directors (which had 11 mem-
bers). This allowed the Kremlin to exercise a great deal of control
over all decisions made by that organ Ð in order to ensure that
crucial votes proceeded as required, it was enough to ÔconvinceÕ
one member of the Board. In June 2000, during the annual meet-
ings of the shareholders, five state representatives were again
chosen as new members of the Board. This time however,
the group consisted not of people closely linked with GazpromÕs
management (for example, Viktor Chernomyrdin lost the post as
the member) but of those loyal to the president. The deputy chief
of the Presidential Administration Dimitri Medvedev was chosen
as president of the Board of Directors. Since then the Board of
Directors, which used to play only a marginal role, has gained
importance. Its sessions started to be called once a month (pre-
viously once every six months). In October 2000, the Board took
an unprecedented decision and banned the management 
from selling any assets of the company without the approval 
of the Board of Directors. It is difficult to establish right now 
to what extent has Kremlin succeeded in blocking the process of
illegal transfer of Gazprom assets. There is no doubt however,
that the Kremlin has now become much more capable of doing
this than in the past.
Apart from political changes (control over Gazprom and its man-
agement) one crucial change concerning economic regulations
was introduced last year. On November 8, 2000, Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov established a committee responsible for
reviewing applications from independent gas producers who want
to gain access to GazpromÕs network. Kasyanov decided that
independent producers can use up to 15 percent of pipeline
capacity if Gazprom is not making full use of them. Thus, the first
ever attempt has been made in Russia to de-monopolize gas
transport. It is difficult to say today to what extent those attempts
proved to be successful.
Reform Games
Even these minor changes introduced to the Russian gas sector
over recent months have proved very controversial, and have led
to tensions among various political and economic lobby groups.
The possible restructuring of Gazprom and even a partial liberal-
ization of the gas market would inevitably result in a political
storm in Russia. It would surely force the government to oscillate
between various political forces, both in Russia and abroad.
To simplify, the interests of the potential players in such ÔgamesÕ
could be characterised in the following way: the Russian oil lobby
would support the reform. Breaking the gas monopoly would give
the oil-producing enterprises access to the gas pipelines. Lack of
such access makes it impossible for many oil companies to
exploit gas resources that they already own. Also, some of the
financial magnates would support restructuring of the gas sector
Ð those who would perceive the reform as a chance to gain con-
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trol over the assets of the gas giant. The International Monetary
Fund would surely be in favour of the liberalization of the gas sec-
tor as well Ð it has been an ardent advocate of the liberalization,
at least in part, of the Russian economy. It is not clear, however,
how creditors or shareholders would react to the changes. 
For those groups, well-implemented reform could also prove ben-
eficial in the long-run. However, the process of restructuring
could be corrupted, and as a result the values of GazpromÕs
assets could fall significantly, and some credit might not even be
paid off at all.
Finally, owners and managers of big enterprises, for whom high-
er gas prices would inevitably mean bankruptcy, would definitely
be opposed. Most companies in Russia are not ready to pay free-
market prices, either for gas or energy.
Fearing higher prices and unemployment, most ordinary Russians
would also be very critical of the reform.
Another important group who would oppose the reform of the sec-
tor are regional elites, who would have to pay the price of social
unrest. Local authorities are also afraid of losing an important
tool of influence over local enterprises, to whom at the moment
they can grant various discounts in the form of lower energy fees.
GazpromÕs management are opposed to the changes as well,
fearing they may lose control over the enterprise. The elections of
the new president of the Board of Directors, which are scheduled
for late June, will be of crucial importance. It is likely that the
Kremlin will be able to find a more loyal successor than
Vyakhiryev. One should take into account however, that even after
VyakhiryevÕs departure, the current Board of Gazprom will still
have a very strong position (thanks to some personal links and
due to the fact that those linked to Vyakhiryev most likely own
considerable stakes in the company). Also, the new president,
even if he is loyal to Putin, does not necessarily have to support
the reforms.
To implement reforms in the Russian gas sector, a strong will
and great political determination are needed. For the time being,
it is difficult to establish whether such will exists. The activities
undertaken by the Kremlin so far have centred on gaining control
over the monopoly. That proves that the government is more
interested in quick benefits rather than in real restructuring. One
cannot of course rule out that the reform of the gas sector will be
carried out. However, it is just as likely, if not more so, that the
Kremlin will limit its activities to the continuation of the minor
short-term changes that were launched last year.
The situation in the gas sector will soon allow us to see
whether the government is really planning Ð as it says it is Ð
to implement serious economic reforms, or whether it has
adopted a ÔsurvivalÕ strategy and will limit itself only to
superficial changes.
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